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1. Introduction 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the question of the responsibility of the state for 
injuries done by rebels to foreign nationals, or ‘aliens’, in its territory became an important one 
for international law. Initially, it was common for disputes regarding such responsibility to be 
resolved through diplomacy, backed up, not infrequently, by the threat and even the use of 
force. Later it became a matter which also led increasingly to arbitration; beginning around the 
middle of the nineteenth century a growing number of arbitral tribunals dealt with claims 
against states for injuries done to aliens by rebels. From the first, set up in 1839 between the 
US and Mexico, there followed a series of 40 mixed claims commissions which touched, in 
one way or another, on state responsibility for rebels.1 Nearly three-quarters of these 
arbitrations involved a Western state against one of the new Latin American republics. 
Latin American international lawyers sought from the beginning to resist intervention (of all 
types) on the basis of enforcing state responsibility for injuries to aliens, of which, I argue, 
responsibility for injuries caused by rebels was the archetype. The first moves in the debates 
about state responsibility for rebels tended to be in the mode of resistance. Towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, as the numbers of arbitrations grew rapidly, the issue of if and when a 
state would be responsible for injuries to aliens by rebels began increasingly to draw the 
attention of the new Anglo-American international legal professionals, who sought to 
rationalise a doctrine of state responsibility for rebels from the arbitral practice. By the early 
                                                            
1 As there is no comprehensive collection of international arbitral awards I have been dependent on cross-checking 
secondary sources such as: J. Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the 
United States Has Been a Party (1898); W. Evans Darby, International Tribunals (1904); J. H. Ralston, The Law 
and Procedure of International Tribunals (1926); H. Silvanie, ‘Responsibility of States for Acts of Insurgent 




twentieth century this dynamic of resistance and development had driven the emergence of a 
flourishing, if profoundly disputed, sub-field of international law. This was the central part of 
the wider field of alien protection, which concerned the rights of states to protect their nationals 
overseas and the duties of states when it came to the treatment of aliens.  
In this paper, I will explore how intervention in Latin America, and particularly its turn to 
arbitration, produced the doctrine of state responsibility for injuries to aliens caused by rebels.2 
In Section 2, I will look at the first moves of resistance from Latin American scholars, focusing 
on the work of Carlos Calvo. Section 3 addresses the turn to arbitration and explains how this 
was a product of the Americas, which drove the development of the doctrine of state 
responsibility for rebels. In Section 4, I consider the legal debates, occurring during the period 
c.1870-1930 and particularly from the turn of the twentieth century onwards, which contested 
the doctrine. I propose that this is understood as a struggle for the internationalisation of ‘aliens 
versus rebels’: what standard (national or international) of protection against rebels did states 
owe foreign nationals and, most importantly, who had the power to decide (domestic or 
international authority)? While nearly all the various positions made responsibility the 
exception rather than rule, Latin American international lawyers tended towards narrow 
exceptions defined by reference to national treatment in contrast with Anglo-Americans who 
based responsibility on an expansive international standard of alien protection. Finally, I reflect 
upon what was at stake in this legal contestation – namely, foreign trade and investment in 
Latin America and the transition from old colonialism to new economic imperialism in the 
region – and what its legacy might be for international law today. 
                                                            
2 Two excellent recent works from Latin American scholars which cover this period and to which I am greatly 
indebted are: A. Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842–1933 (2014); J. P. 




Given the controversies of recent years surrounding historical contextualism and international 
legal history, I will briefly address some questions of methodology before getting underway. 
TWAIL (Third-World Approaches to International Law) history, within which scholarship this 
piece could also be read, has received accusations of anachronism and not conforming to 
‘correct’ historical methods from certain historians.3 However, following Anne Orford,4 my 
work questions whether ‘[h]istorical methods provide the only form of interpretive practice 
that can produce an adequate knowledge of the past, not only for historians but also for 
international lawyers’.5 In international law, past and present have a different relationship: 
‘[i]nternational law is inherently genealogical, depending as it does upon the transmission of 
concepts, languages and norms across time and space. The past, far from being gone, is 
constantly being retrieved as a source or rationalisation of present obligation.’6 As result, as 
Orford argues, limiting ourselves to producing histories that a particular school of historians 
would approve of shuts down the potential for meaningful critique.7 Accordingly, while in 
sympathy with contextualist historians I aim to understand the development of a legal doctrine 
in context, as a political intervention in a particular situation and particular relations of power, 
my work is at the same time unapologetically presentist. I seek to historicize international law 
so as to enable a critical redescription of its present,8 without meaning to suggest that there is 
necessarily any simplistic causal connection between then and now. 
                                                            
3 See, e.g., R. Lesaffer, ‘International Law and its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love’, in M. Craven, M. 
Fitzmaurice and M. Vogiatzi (eds.), Time, History and International Law (2007), 27; I. Hunter, ‘Global Justice 
and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of Nature and Nations’, in S. Dorsett and I. Hunter 
(eds.), Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire (2010), 11. 
4 See A. Orford, ‘The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law’, in 
M. Toufayan, E. Tourme-Jouannet, and H. Ruiz Fabri (eds.), International Law And New Approaches To The 
Third World: Between Repetition And Renewal (2013), 97; A. Orford, ‘International Law and the Limits of 
History’, in W. Werner, A. Galán, and M. de Hoon (eds.), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti 
Koskenniemi (2017), 297. 
5 Orford, ‘Limits of History’, supra note 4, at 312. 
6 A. Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, (2013) 1 Lond Rev Int Law 170, at 175. 
7 Orford, ‘Limits of History’, supra note 4, at 305-6. 




2. Resistance: the first moves 
In 1869, Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo published an article arguing for the non-responsibility 
of the state for harm caused to aliens as a result of riot or civil war.9 This included where such 
harm was caused by rebels, a scenario that, I will argue, was central to Calvo’s thinking. Calvo 
argued that state responsibility, or the principle of compensation, for civil war damage would 
create an unwarrantable inequality between foreigners and nationals to the benefit of powerful 
states at the expense of weaker ones and infringe the principle of territorial jurisdiction. For 
Calvo, such responsibility is a matter for the domestic courts.10 At the same time, he argued 
that civil war, as a circumstance which ‘often takes a country to the edge of the abyss’, is an 
exception to the general rule of compensation since civil war amounts to a situation of force 
majeure.11 
Calvo cites a number of examples of opinion and practice supporting non-responsibility. He 
begins with statements rejecting responsibility from a number of politicians, diplomats and 
academics in respect of the Don Pacifico affair between Britain and Greece – when British 
gunboats were infamously sent in after an anti-Semitic mob attacked the house of a British 
citizen in Athens – and two editorials from the British press in the context of the French 
intervention in Mexico.12 Moving on to practice, Calvo’s examples include the British claims 
against Tuscany and Naples in respect of the harm caused to British nationals in the 
revolutionary disturbances there in 1849-1850 – apparently abandoned after the Austrians 
intervened at the request of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Russians refused to arbitrate 
on the basis that Britain had no right to bring such claims; the rejection by the US of claims in 
                                                            
9 C. Calvo, ‘De la Non-Responsibilité des États a Raison des Dommages Soufferts par des Étrangers en Cas 
d’Émeute ou de Guerre Civile’, (1869) 1 (1d series) Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee 
417. 
10 Calvo, ‘De la Non-Responsibilité des États’, supra note 9, at 417. 
11 Calvo, ‘De la Non-Responsibilité des États’, supra note 9, at 422. 




respect of harm caused to Spanish nationals during mob violence in New Orleans in 1851; and 
non-responsibility for rebels in respect of the revolution in Venezuela in 1859, the Polish 
insurrection against Russian rule of 1863-64, and the US civil war.13 
We see a number of further reasons for non-responsibility being put forward: that those who 
go abroad for commerce must accept the risk of internal disorders and submit to domestic 
jurisdiction; the state’s lack of control over insurrectionary subjects; the right of the state to use 
force for its own preservation; and the need to avoid revolutionaries being able to take 
advantage of the presence of aliens to cause diplomatic incidents. Where European states had 
paid indemnities in respect of damage caused by rebels, and Calvo here takes examples from 
France, Belgium and Italy, he argues that such payments were ex gratia rather than indicative 
of a legal obligation. Calvo ends by stating that there is no support in practice for the principle 
of responsibility for civil war damage and that when powerful states pretend to impose such a 
right this is an abuse of power contrary to international law.14 
Calvo’s article is significant for a number of reasons. For one thing, a number of the arguments 
and concepts which Calvo raises here, such as risk, due diligence, equality with nationals, and 
force majeure, are central to the later debates about responsibility for rebels. In a sense Calvo 
really sets the tone for what comes afterwards both as a matter of substance and method. His 
exclusion of contrary practice as a breach of the rule of non-responsibility and his manoeuvring 
of the (ultimately ambiguous) practice to support his position anticipates subsequent exchanges 
(Calvo does not mention, for example, that following the Don Pacifico affair Greece ultimately 
paid compensation as did Tuscany and Naples despite Austrian and Russian support).15 For 
                                                            
13 Calvo, ‘De la Non-Responsibilité des États’, supra note 9, at 419-26. 
14 Calvo, ‘De la Non-Responsibilité des États’, supra note 9, at 427. 
15 Regarding the Don Pacifico affair, see J. Goebel, ‘International Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained 
by Aliens on Account of Mob Violence Insurrections and Civil Wars’, (1914) 8 AJIL 802, at 820; and, regarding 
Tuscany and Naples, see H. Arias, ‘The Non-Liability of States for Damages Suffered by Foreigners in the Course 




example, in the 1913 and 1914 issues of the American Journal of International Law, Julius 
Goebel, professor at Columbia Law School, and Harmodio Arias, future president of Panama, 
published almost mirror image articles arguing opposite points of view.16 In his article Goebel 
sets out a series of examples of intra-European practice so as to establish a rule of responsibility 
for rebels and criticises Latin American states for trying to deny this rule. Arias, meanwhile, 
sets out a series of different examples of intra-European practice so as to establish a rule of 
non-responsibility for rebels and criticises Western states for not applying this rule in their 
dealings with Latin American states. This seems a rather crude caricature of the West versus 
Latin America clash. Nevertheless, it shows how flexible the material is and how it was 
marshalled to support various different, even dramatically opposed, positions. 
Calvo’s article was the first specialist piece addressing state responsibility for rebels (in the 
first volume of the first international law journal, the Revue de Droit International et de 
Legislation Comparee). Calvo was not the only Latin American international lawyer who was 
leading the way in this field. For example, Peruvian scholar Carlos Wiesse’s Reglas de Derecho 
Internacional Aplicables á las Guerras Civiles, first published in 1893, was one of, if not the 
first monograph on civil war and international law and contained a significant section on 
responsibility.17 In his day, Wiesse was noted as one of the few Latin American international 
lawyers to argue for a general rule of responsibility.18 Wiesse proposed responsibility for rebels 
on the basis of lack of due diligence and denial of justice with a few particular rules carved out 
of this – for example in the case of successful rebels where there was full responsibility and 
recognition of belligerency where responsibility was entirely excluded.19 Despite this, he was 
commonly associated with the argument that the state should be held responsible for all acts of 
                                                            
16 Goebel, supra note 15; Arias, supra note 15. 
17 C. Wiesse, Reglas de Derecho Internacional Aplicables á las Guerras Civiles (1893). 
18 See J. W. Garner, ‘Responsibility of States for Injuries Suffered by Foreigners within their Territories on 
Account of Mob Violence, Riots and Insurrection’, (1927) 21 ASIL Proc 49, at 59. 




rebels on the basis of fault in letting the rebellion arise.20 Nevertheless, Wiesse certainly takes 
a notably different approach to Calvo; there was far from being one unitary regional position.21 
Another example is Argentine diplomat and international lawyer Luis Podestá Costa.22 His 
1913 work El Extranjero en la Guerra Civil devotes five out of six chapters to the question of 
state responsibility.23 At the time it was published it was certainly the most extensive existing 
treatment of responsibility in the context of rebellion and civil war, and possibly still is today. 
I will look at Podestá Costa’s work in more detail below. 
Returning to Calvo, he is, of course, most famous for his eponymous doctrine under which 
Latin American states denied that international law applied to, particularly, contracts with 
aliens and, more generally, to state-alien relations. Including so-called ‘Calvo clauses’ in such 
contracts, and in their regional treaties and constitutions,24 Latin American states sought to 
limit aliens to domestic remedies in an attempt to protect their newfound independence from 
foreign intervention – in the form either of bombardment, invasion or occupation or of 
international arbitration on unfair terms – which, as we shall see, was often justified on the 
basis of enforcing alien protection claims.  
Calvo’s publication of his 1869 article has led to it being argued that even though the Calvo 
doctrine was clearly of much wider application, ‘[t]he attribution of State responsibility for the 
                                                            
20 See, e.g., E. M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, Or, The Law of International Claims 
(1915), 229. 
21 One particularly interesting contrast with Calvo is in respect of the equal treatment principle, which Calvo was 
so well-known for defending. For Wiesse, the fact that a state denies indemnity to nationals, as a matter of force 
and abuse, cannot justify their doing so in respect of aliens. See C. Wiesse, Reglas de Derecho Internacional 
Aplicables a las Guerras Civiles (1905), 87. 
22 Podestá Costa was Legal Adviser to the League of Nations (a rank of under secretary-general) from 1936 to 
1939 and headed the League of Nations mission to Latin America in 1938. See A. McPherson, Beyond 
Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations (2015), 239ff. 
23 L. A. Podestá Costa, El Extranjero en la Guerra Civil (1913). See also his later Ensayo sobre las Luchas Civiles 
y el Derecho Internacional (1926). 
24 See M. R. García Mora, ‘The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions and International Law’, (1950) 33 




conduct of revolutionaries was perhaps the chief normative concern underlying [it]’.25 Calvo 
never made such a statement explicitly. However, although the article does address wider issues 
of responsibility for harm caused by state forces in civil war and by mobs or rioters, it is 
evidently based on the section of Calvo’s 1868 treatise, Derecho Internacional Teórico y 
Práctico de Europa y América, headed ‘responsibility for damages caused by factions to 
foreigners’.26 It seems significant that it was this section in particular that Calvo chose to work 
up into a separate piece, and in French so as to reach a wider European audience. 
The argument that the Calvo doctrine was aimed at state responsibility for rebels seems even 
more compelling if we consider that harm caused by rebels was the central case of alien 
protection. Many arbitrations, including the most influential, followed revolutions or civil 
wars.27 As Martti Koskenniemi notes, ‘by far most of [the nineteenth century international] 
litigation had concerned the violation of the private rights of Americans in connection with 
internal disturbances and changes of government especially in Latin America’.28 Harm caused 
by rebels was a key issue in these arbitrations. For example, according to Jackson Ralston, 
leading authority on international arbitration and umpire at the US-Venezuelan commission of 
1903, ‘[b]efore the various commissions sitting in Caracas in 1903, no question received more 
careful examination’ than that of responsibility for (unsuccessful) rebels.29 That a number of 
                                                            
25 M. Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (2013), 22 fn 72. 
Martti Koskenniemi has also described the Calvo doctrine as the principle ‘that governments should not be held 
responsible for damage caused by acts of domestic insurgents’. See M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (2002), 18 fn 23. Scholars in the early decades of the 
twentieth century also linked the Calvo doctrine to civil war and insurrection. See, e.g., A.S. Hershey, ‘The Calvo 
and Drago Doctrines’, (1907) 1 AJIL 26, at 26-7; G. G. Phillips, ‘The Anglo-Mexican Special Claims 
Commission’, (1933) 49 LQR 226, at 235. 
26 C. Calvo, Derecho Internacional Teórico y Práctico de Europa y América (1868), at §291. 
27 T. A. Nissel, A History of State Responsibility: The Struggle for International Standards (1870-1960) (PhD 
thesis, University of Helsinki 2016), 78-9. These include most notably the 1868 Mexico-US commission, which 
addressed claims arising from the Mexican Reform War (among others); the Venezuela commissions of 1903, 
which followed the period of frequent revolution and civil war which the country suffered during the 1890s; and 
the Mexican commissions of the 1920s arising out of the Mexican revolution of 1910-1920. 
28 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication and the 1907 Hague Conference’, in Topicality 
of the 1907 Hague Conference, the Second Peace Conference (2008), 127 at 149 (emphasis added). 




international law organisations, such as the Institut de Droit International, the American 
Society of International Law (ASIL) and the International Law Association, discussed 
specifically at their meetings or had special projects on responsibility for harm arising from 
insurrection or civil war further emphasises the centrality of the topic.30 
However, writing in 1869, Calvo was anticipating more than responding to this. There were 
only a handful of arbitrations prior to 1870 that addressed state responsibility for rebels. In 
calling the issue ‘one of the most important questions in international law discussed in modern 
times’,31 Calvo was really some 25-30 years too early. So what was the context for Calvo’s 
article? In it he refers to ‘violence exercised in South America by certain European nations’, 
noting that ‘certain maritime powers of the Old World’ have, in Latin America, resorted to 
force to support their diplomatic claims. He does not give any specific examples in the article, 
but in Derecho Internacional he mentions particularly the French intervention in Mexico, the 
pretext for which was unpaid claims arising out of the War of the Reform, the civil war which 
Mexico had suffered from 1857-1861. Calvo notes that: 
These indemnities [for alien protection claims] made without scrutiny, some with 
grounds and some without, but always with a threat on the part of European 
governments of supporting their claims with force, have been the most copious source 
of interventions by said governments in Latin America.32 
                                                            
30 While harm arising from insurrection or civil war of course also covers harm caused by the state in suppressing 
rebellion, it was responsibility for acts of rebels that caused the most controversy here. See (1900) 18 Annuaire 
de l’Institut de Droit International 233-56; L. A. Podestá Costa, ‘International Responsibility of the State for 
Damage Suffered by Aliens during Civil War’, (1922) 31 International Law Association Reports of Conferences 
119; K. Strupp, ‘Responsabilité de l’État en Cas de Dommages Causes aux Ressortissants d’un État Étranger en 
Cas de Troubles, d’Émeutes, ou de Guerres Civiles’, (1922) 31 International Law Association Reports of 
Conferences 127; Garner, supra note 18. 





As Calvo was writing the French would have been recently expelled, Emperor Maximilian 
executed and the Republic restored by Benito Juárez. 
We believe … that the results of the French intervention in Mexico will have made the 
governments of Europe understand that they must uphold with Latin America the same 
principles they uphold among themselves. The lesson has been very severe to expect 
that it would repeat itself again.33 
Unfortunately, Calvo was to prove to be incorrect with this prediction. It is interesting that he 
entirely overlooks the US here, focusing only on European intervention. This is a crucial 
oversight, a blind spot perhaps created by the French and British interventions in Argentina in 
the late 1830s and 1840s, which Calvo discussed at length in Derecho Internacional.34 As 
Martti Koskenniemi has argued, ‘state responsibility for injuries to aliens was really an 
American [US and Latin American] topic’.35 This we shall explore in the next section. 
3. The turn to arbitration 
3.1. As a product of the Americas 
The debates about state responsibility for rebels did not really take off until the 1890s once the 
‘turn to arbitration’ had really been established, and while there was practice among and 
involving European states, it was the prevalence of arbitration which set the inter-American 
practice apart. Nearly three-quarters of the arbitrations addressing state responsibility for rebels 
involved a Western power against a Latin American country.36 Over a third of these involved 
the US, and it is particularly the earlier arbitrations that the US dominates: it was a party to ten 
                                                            
33 Ibid. 
34 Calvo, Derecho Internacional, supra note 26, at §§87-8. 
35 Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication’, supra note 28, at 149. 
36 See Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication’, supra note 28, at 133, for some other arbitration 




of the first 15 mixed claims commissions addressing state responsibility for rebels between 
1839 and 1892. This turn to arbitration was thus produced in the Americas, by both the US and 
the states of Latin America. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century the US was relatively weak, both militarily and 
economically, compared, for example, to Britain. During this period, Britain was the biggest 
capital importer into Latin America and its Royal Navy was globally dominant. The US, 
seeking to increase the economic and political control over its southern neighbours to which it 
felt entitled, made a strategic choice for arbitration, imposed by force on unfair terms, rather 
than outright invasion or occupation, to try and oust its European rivals and assert its interests 
in the region.37 Despite arbitration being widely seen as peaceful and non-interventionist, ‘[t]he 
United States Government was, in fact, never more interested in arbitration than in the 1890s 
– a time also of war and expansion’.38 Arbitration offered the US a new type of imperialism. It 
accorded with a widespread US self-understanding as anti-imperialist but under a guise of 
legality allowed for the universalisation of the US way of doing things.39 That arbitration 
increased such a great deal after 1870, and particularly after 1890, and began to involve the 
European powers more and more is testament to the success of US policy here.40 
Calvo might have seen this coming. In 1839, the US and Mexico signed a convention to submit 
US claims arising out of the revolutionary unrest of the first decades of Mexican independence 
to a mixed claims commission. The US accepted Mexico’s offer to arbitrate only after, 
                                                            
37 See Nissel, supra note 27, at 59-70; B.A. Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign 
Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (2016), 11, 26, 30-31. 
38 Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication’, supra note 28, at 133. The 1890s saw the Spanish 
American war of 1898 and the US invasion and occupation of Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. 
39 Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication’, supra note 28, at 129. 
40 Only seven out of the 41 arbitrations addressing responsibility for rebels occurred before 1870, and only 13 
before 1890. However, there were nine during the 1890s alone. Compared with US involvement in ten of the first 
15 such arbitrations, of the 28 that took place after 1890, only four involved the US. The big arbitrations of this 





however, President Jackson had, in 1837, recommended Congress pass an act to authorise 
reprisals against Mexico should they refuse to settle claims upon a final demand which was to 
be made from on board a US warship positioned off the Mexican coast. On 30 January 1843, 
Mexico and the US signed new convention to deal with the payment of settled claims, which 
had been set back by Mexico’s financial difficulties during this period. Attempts were also 
made to negotiate a new convention to deal with the settlement of outstanding claims as the 
1839 commission had not finished its work. However, the treaty remained unratified after the 
US refused to cede to Mexican demands for mutuality so as to cover claims against the US 
regarding Texas, which had rebelled and declared its independence in 1836. Tension increased 
when Mexico fell behind on its payments under the 30 January convention. Relations 
deteriorated further when in 1845 the US Congress approved the annexation of Texas. 
In 1846, the US invaded Mexico after a skirmish in disputed border territory was presented by 
President Polk as an attack on the US by Mexico. In his declaration of war, Polk observed that 
‘the grievous wrongs perpetrated by Mexico upon our citizens throughout a long period of 
years remain unredressed, and solemn treaties, pledging her public faith for this redress have 
been disregarded’.41 The enforcement of alien protection claims thus an explicit part of the 
US’s justification for declaring war on Mexico, and also offered a convenient cover for and 
juridical legitimisation of US expansionist ambitions.42 In the war which followed, Mexico was 
defeated and on 2 February 1848 signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with the victorious 
US. The US gained Texas, California and New Mexico, nearly half of Mexico’s territory. On 
its side, the US agreed to pay any unpaid alien protection claims under the 1839 convention 
and discharge any unsettled claims in accordance with the unratified 1843 convention. In 
                                                            
41 Moore, supra note 1, Vol. 2, at 1247. 
42 ‘In the early decades of relations between Mexico and the United States, the latter harbored territorial ambitions 
in Mexico, and often the support of claims for injury to American citizens was employed as an instrument of 
pressure to further such territorial designs.’ A. H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions, 1923-1934: A Study 




addition, following the restoration of the republic there was a further mixed claims commission 
with the US in 1868. The 1868 commission was huge, with over 2,000 claims,43 and considered 
Mexico’s responsibility for rebels during the War of the Reform and for the French-imposed 
Maximilian government.44 
While, as we just saw above, the US ‘adopted [arbitration] as an aspect of its foreign policy’, 
Latin America’s relationship to arbitration was more ambivalent. Although they challenged its 
imposition through force and its biased operation, Latin American states also promoted 
arbitration.45 Arbitration was not only preferable to direct military intervention. It also reflected 
domestic elites’ liberal values and in some cases furthered their interests.46 As Tzvika Alan 
Nissel has argued, although arbitration was often imposed upon Latin American states by the 
threat or use of force, it also: 
bolstered their sense of independence from European political domination … ensured 
the continued flow of foreign capital into Latin American markets, … [was] an 
acceptable price for recognition. … [and] played into the strategy among Liberal rulers 




43 J. I. Rodríguez, La Comisión Mixta de Reclamaciones Mexicanas y Americanas (1873), 15. 
44 For more on the 1868 commission see Rodríguez, supra note 43; Moore, supra note 1, Vol. 2, at 1287-1360; 
Nissel, supra note 27, at 87-99 (arguing that it was 1868 commission, rather than the Alabama claims, which was 
the first modern international arbitration). 
45 For example, at the Third International Conference of American States in 1906, a resolution was adopted to 
‘ratify adherence to the principle of arbitration’ and to endeavour to secure at the forthcoming second Hague Peace 
Conference a general arbitration convention. See J. B. Scott (ed.), The International Conferences of American 
States 1889-1928 (1931), 124-125. See also J. T. Gathii, ‘War’s Legacy in International Investment Law’, (2009) 
11 International Community Law Review 353. 
46 For example, during the Mexican revolution, various governments used the offer of arbitration as an incentive 
for foreign governments to recognise them. See Chapter 2 in Feller, supra note 42. Alejandro Alvarez is a good 
example of a Latin American liberal internationalist who advocated arbitration. For a general overview of the 
reasons why Latin American states agreed to arbitration, see Nissel, supra note 27, at 71-7. 




3.2. As the driver of doctrine development 
It was towards the end of the nineteenth century, as the numbers of arbitrations grew rapidly, 
that the issue of if and when a state would be responsible for injuries to aliens by rebels began 
increasingly to draw the attention of the new Anglo-American international legal professionals, 
who sought to rationalise a doctrine of state responsibility for rebels from the arbitral practice. 
Why was it that the turn to arbitration drove the doctrinal debates in this way? The 
‘international arbitration movement’, based on a faith in the power of international law and 
arbitration to bring lasting peace to the world, had been gaining momentum since the 1870 
Alabama arbitration, and, by the turn of the century, ‘was at the forefront of the internationalist 
struggle’.48 
This movement was intimately connected to the emerging professional networks of 
international lawyers, particularly in the US. The peace movements of the nineteenth century 
had always been dominated by Anglo-Americans ‘but this was especially the case of its 
emphasis on arbitration towards the end of the century … After the precedent of the Alabama 
affair in 1872, [this] wave of peace movements … began to include lawyers.’49 There was a 
strong relationship between this movement for peace through arbitration and the new 
international law organisations like the Institut de Droit International and the International Law 
Association (both set up in 1873 just a few years after the Alabama arbitration) and ASIL.50 
These organisations all discussed specifically at their meetings or had special projects on 
responsibility for harm arising from insurrection or civil war.51 Latin American international 
lawyers were, of course, also involved in these institutions. Luis Podestá Costa, for example, 
                                                            
48 C. J. Tams, ‘World Peace through International Adjudication?’, in H.-G. Justenhoven, C. Kress, and M. E. 
O’Connell (eds.), Peace Through Law: Reflections on Pacem in Terris from Philosophy, Law, Theology, and 
Political Science (Nomos 2016), 215. 
49 Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication’, supra note 28, at 132. 
50 Ibid. 




took a lead role in the International Law Association’s work on state responsibility for civil 
war damages.52 Of particular note, however, given his huge influence in the field, is the 
significance of the role played in this movement by John Bassett Moore.53 His History and 
Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, published 
in 1898,54 has been described as ‘a kind of apex in [the arbitration movement’s] support from 
the legal profession’.55 It made the arbitral opinions widely available for the first time,56 and 
remains the only readily available means of access to the earlier materials. It was relied upon 
so heavily by subsequent commentators that Moore almost single-handedly set the terms of the 
debates to come.57 
The movement for peace through arbitration was, however, also intimately linked with 
capitalist expansion. The third side of the triangle with peace and arbitration was free trade. On 
one hand, it was thought that free trade would in and of itself bring peace – the rationality of 
business contrasted with the passions of politics.58 At the same time, international adjudication 
would guarantee both: free trade by forcing states to protect overseas commercial interests and 
peace by preventing disputes between states about harm to such interests from escalating into 
war. 
[W]hat were needed were international tribunals that could deal justice to Governments 
trespassing on the rights of innocent foreigners carrying out business in their territories 
… International adjudication – in this American version – is based on the assumption 
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that international problems are caused by Governments and experienced by individuals 
as violations of rights. A system of rules and tribunals will stabilize and protect those 
rights, enabling individuals and commercial operators to plan their activities and use 
the opportunities of enrichment available in the international world by interacting with 
each other through private contracts.59 
Fitting in with their liberal internationalist (read capitalist imperialist) project then, the turn to 
arbitration was thus a crucial factor in attracting the interest of the new professional Anglo-
American international lawyers, who sought to draw on the growing arbitral practice and 
rationalise it into rules of responsibility. As Tzvika Alan Nissel has argued, ‘[a]s arbitrators 
developed more positive law in practice, [US] writers updated their commentaries … By the 
twentieth century, a budding sub-field of alien protection was becoming visible: State 
responsibility for injuries to aliens.’60 It was during the period 1914-1930 that the most 
significant systematisation took place in this respect.61 Most notably, Edwin Borchard’s The 
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, Or, The Law of International Claims was published 
in 1915 and Clyde Eagleton’s The Responsibility of States in International Law followed in 
1928.62 
4. A contested doctrine 
By the early twentieth century this dynamic of resistance and development described in the 
previous two sections had driven the emergence of state responsibility for rebels as a 
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flourishing, if profoundly disputed, sub-field of international law. This is not to say that the 
debates can be reduced to the pro-responsibility West versus anti-responsibility Latin America. 
There was complexity on both sides. Nevertheless, I suggest that we can identify two basic 
opposing currents – albeit not uncontested, clear-cut or singular – which opposed national 
versus international authority and the interests of the newly decolonised capital importing states 
with those of the capital exporting imperial powers. Later, this configuration would play out 
again in the debates about state responsibility which took place after the Second World War.63 
Some Western international lawyers were critical of alien protection. This was evident at the 
ASIL Annual Meeting in 1927. Take this statement, for example, from Raymond Leslie Buell, 
regrettable references to ‘backward’ regions aside: 
Is armed intervention for the protection of property good policy? Should we claim 
damages for aliens in backward regions who have not conducted themselves like 
gentlemen? Judging by the people [i.e. foreigners] that I have seen in many backward 
countries, I feel that some of them should be run out of the country without any 
compensation. I feel it is a debatable question whether [the US] government or any 
government in Europe should support concessions obtained from a country in Central 
America by bribery. I think it is debatable whether this government or any other 
government in the world should claim damages for the so-called confiscation of a 
concession over resources which the government had no legal right to alienate.64 
Even establishment US international lawyers like Borchard and Eagleton did not entirely deny 
the relationship between imperialism and state responsibility for alien protection. The problem 
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was that they did not necessarily see this as a bad thing. The preface to Borchard’s Diplomatic 
Protection opens thus: 
With the drawing together of the world by increased facilities for travel and 
communication, the number of persons going abroad for purposes of business or of 
pleasure has steadily increased. Coincidentally, an increasing amount of capital, 
American as well as European, has been seeking investment in foreign countries, and 
the growth of international commerce and intercourse has resulted in the creation of 
vast commercial and other interests abroad. These movements of men, money, and 
commodities, while of economic advantage to the exploiting and to the exploited 
country and establishing bonds of mutual dependency between them, also create 
occasional friction.65 
Capitalist imperialism, then, is the context to which the development of alien protection 
responded; it is a matter of, in Borchard’s words, ‘the growth and necessities of commerce’. 
Although Borchard adds that this is ‘combined with the enlightened views of individual rights 
which the French Revolution brought in its train’, it is business that is presented as the primary 
driver.66 Eagleton also gives the doctrine of state responsibility for injuries to aliens 
unapologetically imperialist underpinnings. 
[T]here are … great potentialities for compelling the maintenance of better standards 
of justice within countries which may have been remiss in this respect, to the advantage 
not only of aliens, but of the nationals themselves. As judicial standards more and more 
approach uniformity within the different states, intercourse between states through the 
interchange of inhabitants and articles of commerce is more unobstructed and 
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encouraged, and the community of nations becomes more homogenous and less subject 
to the psychological reactions produced by ignorance.67 
For Eagleton, state responsibility for alien protection has a mission that is both explicitly 
civilizing and about opening up the world to commerce. 
Borchard is critical of the practice of some European nations in enforcing claims for harm 
caused by rebels against Latin American states on the basis of ‘a lack of diligence in preventing 
or suppressing uprisings’. He argues that ‘the highest interests of the state are too deeply 
involved in the avoidance of such commotions’ to suppose that they are the result of negligence 
occasioning international responsibility. He goes on to note that such negligence would be 
difficult to prove and that, ‘if the claims rested upon this ground alone few of them could be 
prosecuted to payment’. 
[A]ssuming that the government is so organized that civil commotion is only a 
fortuitous event and not one invited by lack of proper political organization, the Latin-
American republics would appear to deserve support in their endeavors to be relieved 
from the diplomatic pressure of claims resulting from injuries suffered in the legitimate 
operations incident to civil war, or caused by insurgents.68 
Eagleton also admits that ‘the indefiniteness of the standard leaves small states at the mercy of 
larger ones in the matter of such claims’.69 Like Borchard, he addresses the Latin American 
experience, noting that, ‘[i]t is a notorious fact … that successful claims for damages due to 
civil war disturbances have rarely been prosecuted except against the Latin-American states, 
or occasionally against other weaker states’.70 
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However, despite this criticism, Borchard ultimately characterises the problem as abuse of what 
was basically a sound doctrine: ‘the element of physical power and political expediency [has 
been permitted] at times to obscure and even obliterate purely legal rights’71 This is in contrast 
with Podestá Costa, who saw abuse as a virtually inevitable consequence of the nature of the 
doctrine, arguing that state responsibility for civil war damage ‘leads almost fatally to abuse, 
because it has a fiction as its foundation’.72 Eagleton goes even further than Borchard. At the 
ASIL annual meeting in 1927 Eagleton damned José Gustavo Guerrero – unfairly as we shall 
see below – as ‘naturally represent[ing] the heterodox Latin American position’ which was, in 
Eagleton’s view ‘destructive to international law’. However, this insult may well be more 
applicable to Eagleton himself, who represents the extremes of the partisan US approach. 
Eagleton argues that ‘one is free to put his own construction’ on the ‘notorious’ practice against 
Latin American states. For Eagleton, it is not necessarily ‘always the bullying conduct of a 
more powerful against a weaker state unable to resist’ or ‘unwarranted aggression’ since, 
‘[c]hronic civil disturbances have, in some of these states, demonstrated their failure to measure 
up to the standard [of alien protection] required’.73 This, Eagleton argues, ultimately justifies 
intervention: 
[T]he possibility of abuse … is, after all, the usual weakness of international law; and 
it has the corresponding advantage of achieving improvement in the administration of 
justice in all states … Until the standard is more precisely stated, and until an 
international organization is effected capable of giving a fair and impartial 
interpretation of the principle, the right of a state to intervene in disregard of local 
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remedies, where they are insufficient, must be justified by the importance of the 
principle of responsibility itself.74 
Although only a few Western international lawyers were meaningfully critical of alien 
protection, a number of Latin Americans supported a certain degree of responsibility, even as 
they contested its content and enforcement. On one hand, this was for strategic reasons – as a 
condition of Western recognition of their statehood and to encourage foreign investment. On 
the other, it reflected their liberal legal sensibility; Calvo’s successors, like José Gustavo 
Guerrero and Luis Podestá Costa, were modern liberal internationalists, for whom international 
law was a result of international community, leaving behind the classical, sovereignty-based 
approach of the early nineteenth century.75 Despite sometimes being portrayed as such,76 Latin 
American international lawyers were not radical iconoclasts. 
For example, the Convention Relative to the Rights of Aliens adopted by the Second 
International Conference of American States in 1902 provided that, ‘[s]tates are not responsible 
for damages sustained by aliens through acts of rebels … and in general, for damages 
originating from … the acts of war, whether civil or national; except in the case of failure on 
the part of the constituted authorities to comply with their duties’.77 It also excepted from the 
exclusion of international remedies ‘cases where there shall have been on the part of the Court, 
a manifest denial of justice, or unusual delay, or evident violation of the principles of 
International Law’.78 James Garner, in his paper to ASIL’s roundtable conference on the 
‘responsibility of states for injuries suffered by foreigners within their territories on account of 
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mob violence, riots and insurrection’ at its annual meeting in 1927,79 noted that in the treaties 
Latin American states had entered into among themselves many more recognised an exception 
to non-responsibility in the case of fault or negligence than recognised absolute non-
responsibility.80 
The Guerrero Report,81 which became infamous for its supposedly restrictive stance on 
responsibility apparently in purely self-interested defence of the Latin American position, is 
another example; it is more complex and subtle than the partisan diatribe it has been considered 
in certain quarters. Indeed, it shows that Guerrero is a good liberal internationalist. The sanctity 
of property, for example, is a cornerstone of his thinking, as is the public-private divide.82 He 
recognises that there are international standards governing protection of aliens; he argues that 
the international community recognises rights to life, liberty and property as ‘universal’ beyond 
nationality,83 just as Borchard does in very similar terms.84 Guerrero also makes exceptions to 
the general rule of non-responsibility for acts of rebels in the event of appropriation of property 
and denial of justice.85 
Although in the 1890s a number of arguments were raised proposing general responsibility for 
acts of rebels,86 by the first decades of the twentieth century, Anglo-American international 
lawyers also largely supported a general rule of non-responsibility, with an exception where 
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the government had failed to exercise due diligence in protecting alien interests from rebels or 
repair any harm through the domestic courts. There was also an exception for successful rebels, 
now well-known as Article 10 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, but which at the time received relatively little attention, one of a number of 
peripheral exceptions to the general rule.87 
Borchard argued that there was now ‘general support’ for a principle of non-responsibility for 
acts of rebels ‘unless there is proven fault or a want of due diligence on the part of the 
authorities in preventing the injury or in suppressing the revolution’.88 This support, according 
to Borchard, can be found ‘on the part of writers, of arbitral commissions, and of foreign offices 
… [and] in numerous treaties between the states of Europe and the Latin-American republics’. 
He sets this authority out in a footnote spanning four pages.89 Borchard cites commentators 
that I mention here – such as Calvo, Moore, Wiesse, Arias, Goebel and Podestá Costa – as well 
as others,90 despite the fact that they represent a wide variety of different positions. The most 
significant references are, however, the arbitral decisions, with a notable number from the 
Venezuela commissions of 1903.91 Borchard rejects the significance of a number of decisions 
making exception to his general principle.92 The only diplomatic practice cited is that of Britain 
and the US. The latter of course denied responsibility for the Confederate rebels. Overall, this 
footnote is typical of the way in which commentators manoeuvred the highly malleable 
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materials to support their various positions, emphasising particular sources over others and 
explaining contrary practice as exceptions to or breaches of their general principles, just as we 
saw Calvo do. Borchard gives no normative justification for his general rule. It is presented as 
simply a matter of rationalising the practice. This is typical of the Anglo-American approach 
that he exemplifies. Borchard was the protégé of John Bassett Moore,93 whose highly 
influential 1898 compilation of arbitrations I have already mentioned above. Borchard 
dedicates Diplomatic Protection to Moore, who supervised his 1914 doctorate of the same title. 
Accordingly, ‘Borchard’s determination to root State responsibility in international practice 
reflects the approach of his mentor and closest colleague’.94 Latin American scholars, in 
contrast, tended towards an approach based on ‘perfecting [rules] and bringing them into 
harmony with new social conditions’ rather than systematising existing rules from practice.95 
This latter approach was seen, understandably, as favouring US interests. 
Eagleton’s use of the arbitral practice takes matters beyond a manipulation of inherently 
malleable materials and into the realm of the sloppy and even the misleading – even his 
colleague Borchard apparently accused Eagleton of being ‘not intellectually honest’.96 In 
support of his statement that ‘factors have at times been present which enabled the tribunal to 
convict the parent state of negligence’, Eagleton cites the Santa Clara Estates Co Case (Britain 
v Venezuela, 1903), the Venezuelan Steam Transportation Company Case (US v Venezuela, 
1892), and the Wenzel Case (Germany v Venezuela, 1903).97 However, in Santa Clara Estates, 
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while it was argued by the British agent that Venezuela was negligent for having failed to 
suppress the revolution for a year, this argument was rejected by the umpire, something which 
Eagleton only mentions in a footnote. In fact, the umpire was sympathetic towards Venezuela, 
alluding to both the foreign finance received by the Matos revolution and the serious impact 
which the blockade had on its funds.98 The supposed reason why Venezuela was held 
responsible in Wenzel – that ‘a fort near the mouth of the Orinoco was held against the 
Venezuelan Government as late as January, 1872, by a ‘Blue’ officer and his wife with two old 
fashioned smoothbore guns equally dangerous at both ends’ – is in fact a quotation from the 
Venezuelan Steam Transportation Company case which was quoted in Wenzel.99 A number of 
commentators, such as Borchard, argued that the Venezuelan Steam Transportation Company 
case was not good precedent since no reasons were given for the decision.100 In the Wenzel case 
responsibility was in fact denied. Despite this, it is more often than not the work of Latin 
America international lawyers which is accused of being unscholarly, including by Eagleton 
himself. 
So, it was the case that nearly all the various positions make responsibility the exception rather 
than the rule.101 However, the scope of the exceptions to non-responsibility was profoundly 
contested. Indeed, such a rule feeds controversy because it can be configured in so many 
ways.102 For example, on one side, it was Guerrero’s narrow definition of denial of justice 
which was the most unacceptable aspect of his report to many rather than any absolute denial 
of responsibility on his part. On the other, arguments made by Anglo-American commentators 
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that the general presumption of non-responsibility was rebutted where ‘it can be shown that a 
state is not reasonably well ordered’ threatened to make the exceptions more important than 
the rule as applied to Latin America. Borchard, for example, having set out his general principle 
of non-responsibility, immediately qualifies it: ‘[t]his doctrine is predicated on the assumption 
that the government is reasonably well ordered, and that revolution and disorder are abnormal 
conditions’.103 He continues: 
‘Where a state has fallen into anarchy, or the administration of law has been nerveless 
or inefficient, or the government has failed to grant to a foreigner the protection 
afforded citizens, or measures within the power of the government have not been taken 
to protect those under its jurisdiction from the acts of revolutionists,’ the general rule is 
suspended and foreign states may not only intervene by force for the protection of their 
subjects, but may demand indemnities, whether the injuries were sustained at the hands 
of the government forces or the insurgents.104 
The quotation here is from the umpire’s opinion in the Sambiaggio case from the Italian-
Venezuelan commission of 1903.105 It is interesting to note that in its original context, its 
meaning is far less clear. Umpire Ralston is in fact noting that Sambiaggio is not such a case 
of anarchy, inadequate administration of justice or failure to protect, but rather one of ‘open, 
flagrant, bloody, and determined war’. Ralston then goes on to discuss the rules applicable to 
the latter case, without pronouncing on the rules applicable to the former. Borchard does not 
offer any authority other than this ambiguous dictum from Sambiaggio in support of this 
position. Under Borchard’s approach, where the general rule of non-responsibility is excluded 
and the use of force is permitted in cases of anarchy, inadequate administration of justice or 
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failure to protect, plenty of scope remains for the type of practice which we saw above Borchard 
seem to be criticising in respect of Latin America. The whole point is that Western governments 
frequently argued – drawing on an image of Latin America that, as we shall see, had more to 
do with ideology than fact – that ‘civil commotion’ was endemic to Latin American societies 
which lacked ‘proper political organization’. 
Eagleton’s position is, again, more extreme than Borchard’s. He argues that, ‘[a state] cannot 
avoid international responsibility on the plea of a deliberate preference for anarchy’.106 He 
notes the ‘many ingenious though vain schemes for evading responsibility’ devised by certain 
Latin American states and argues that, ‘however one may sympathize with them, they are based 
on an antiquated concept of sovereign irresponsibility, and must inevitably prove futile’. In a 
truly extraordinary passage, Eagleton then goes so far as to suggest that a failure to meet the 
international standard of alien protection could lead to (re)colonisation. 
The state which is consistently unable to meet its international obligations has no claim 
to membership in the family of nations. Penalties and restrictions will become 
increasingly burdensome; and its ultimate absorption by a state which is able to assume 
responsibility for the protection of rights within it is within the bounds of historical 
record and reason.107 
Just as controversial as the scope of the exception to non-responsibility was the question of 
who decides. Few international lawyers in fact argued that aliens were entitled to more than 
the same standard of protection from the state against rebels as nationals. The issue was whether 
national or domestic authority determined such a standard, judged whether it had been met and 
enforced it. Eagleton argued: 
                                                            
106 Eagleton, supra note 62, at 144. 




The state must assure to the alien the same amount of protection which it gives to its 
own citizens, no more, no less. While this is unquestionably correct as a general 
statement of the rule, it must always be subject to the proviso that the justice 
administered within a state is satisfactory to the community of nations. A state may be 
responsible, not merely for the same protection which it offers to its own citizens, but 
for a protection which measures up to reasonably standards of civilized justice … [T]his 
international standard of justice … sets a limitation upon the respondent state, and 
prohibits it from setting itself up as the final judge concerning the treatment which 
aliens within its territories receive from its hands.108 
For Eagleton, ‘it cannot be presumed that states have provided and will maintain such excellent 
systems of justice, as to render international supervision unnecessary’.109 We can contrast this 
with the Guerrero Report, which asserts that, ‘[s]tates, as at present organised, possess in 
themselves the necessary means for rendering the protection of foreigners effective’.110 
Similarly Podestá Costa argues that the state’s ‘capacity to ensure [essential rights’] enjoyment 
and exercise has been recognised on its being deemed a sovereignty entity by the rest of the 
nations’.111 
While it was taken for granted that state-state relations were international and state-citizen 
relations were domestic, the nature of state-alien relations was up for grabs. Fundamental to 
Borchard’s approach was the internationalisation of the state-alien relationship. He explains 
that, ‘[w]hen the citizen leaves the national territory he enters the domain of international law. 
By residence abroad … he enters into a new sphere of mutual rights and obligations between 
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himself as a resident alien and the state of his residence.’112 This is in marked contrast with 
Podestá Costa, for whom the alien leaves behind his old national society to enter into a pact 
with his new one.113 While for Borchard and Eagleton the standard of protection is an 
international one, Podestá Costa, for example, defines both negligence and denial of justice by 
reference to domestic standards. The standard of diligence required of a state is ‘that which a 
particular government is used to using in such circumstances’.114 A denial of justice must 
involve a breach of domestic law; the state has fulfilled its obligations when it has allowed the 
foreigner access to the courts to defend his or her legal rights.115 This was thus a struggle for 
the internationalisation of ‘aliens versus rebels’. It was a struggle which took place on the 
terrain of international law, with all sides deploying international legal language and concepts, 
but opposing different understandings of the relationship of the international to the national, an 
opposition which repeated itself in the debates about state responsibility after the Second World 
War. In the next section we will look at what was at stake in this contestation. 
5. State responsibility for rebels in context 
5.1. Capitalist expansion, decolonisation and economic imperialism 
The rise of alien protection was contemporaneous with a period of intensifying penetration of 
US and European capital in recently independent Latin America.116 The legacy of Spanish 
colonialism combined with Western capitalist expansion created an explosive mix of aliens 
and rebels under conditions of violence in the region during the nineteenth century. I propose 
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reading the development of the doctrine of state responsibility for rebels as a response to this. 
In the nineteenth century the newly independent Latin American republics, no longer confined 
to trading with or via Spain, offered a vital market for Europe’s surplus capital and 
manufactured goods. Their natural resources were essential to the continued growth of 
European industry. Foreign investors, merchants and traders arrived in ever increasing numbers 
throughout the century, particularly after around 1880 when the investment of foreign capital 
in Latin America really began in earnest (and when we also see the number of arbitrations rise 
dramatically).117 At the same time, the local elites which took power upon independence 
inherited huge debts and imbalanced economies left de-capitalized and in disarray by the 
devastating impact of the wars of independence. They perceived foreign investment as vital for 
economic recovery and nation building as well as a means to shore up their own internal 
authority and wealth. It was not in their short-term interest, however, to re-balance their 
economies. Being chronically on the verge of bankruptcy, governments were susceptible to the 
demands of foreign finance to maintain or create economic and legal systems which served 
their (foreign finance’s) interests and yet which only reinforced economic instability. 
Such economic instability, combined with the political and social distortions left by centuries 
of brutal and exploitative Spanish colonisation and the violence of the wars of independence, 
also meant that the new Latin American states were open to revolution and civil war. 
Independence had not equated to social reform or an improvement in economic conditions for 
ordinary people – for many precarity had only increased – and such socio-economic injustice 
fomented longstanding unrest. Nation states had been conceived in the interests of ejecting the 
                                                            
117 On foreign investment generally in Latin America since independence, see Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs – Economic Commission for Latin America, External Financing in Latin America, UN Doc 
E/CN.12/649/Rev.1 (1965), at 5-19; A. M. Taylor, ‘Foreign Capital Flows’, in V. Bulmer-Thomas, J. Coatsworth, 
and R. Cortes-Conde (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America (2008), Vol. 2. More specifically, 
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Spanish but there was often little sense of cohesive political community across large and poorly 
connected territories. After years of colonial domination political institutions were weak and 
governments struggled to hold together the contradictions of postcolonial society, especially 
during the frequent economic crises caused by the vulnerability of the new republics to 
fluctuating global commodity prices. However, while the political and economic trials of the 
new republics are undeniable, it is important not to overstate them.118 That nineteenth century 
Latin American existed in a state of perpetual political and financial disorder was in significant 
part a European impression. Such impression was both based upon and functioned so as to 
found and reinforce European assumptions about Latin Americans as violent and frivolous as 
well as serving to legitimise intervention.119 
When foreign commercial interests were harmed by rebels, merchants and traders sought 
protection from their home governments. Prior to decolonisation, this was not an issue. Thanks 
to the pre-independence prohibition on non-Spanish immigration to Latin America and the 
Spanish monopolisation of trade with the region, there would have been few truly ‘foreign’ 
interests in Latin America. Protection of Spanish trade could be assured through the influence 
of the imperial government in Madrid; any question of responsibility for harm caused by rebels 
was dealt by the law of the colonial state. Now the states of Latin America were newly 
sovereign, the Western powers called upon international law to enable them to carry out such 
protection. The doctrine of state responsibility for rebels can thus be understood as a response 
to the decolonisation of Latin America: that is, in response to the need to ‘externalise what had 
                                                            
118 See, e.g., L. M. Summers, ‘Arbitration and Latin America’, (1972) 1 California Western International Law 
Journal 1, at 8, quoting Kalman Silvert: ‘[t]he number of revolutions in Latin America is accentuated by the North 
American, who tends to forget that there are twenty different republics all having their own troubles, and who 
does not understand the patterning of Latin violence, the often reduced number of persons involved, and the built-
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been internal aspects of colonial law and governance’.120 Due to the particular situation of Latin 
America, having already gained recognition as independent states in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the means of protection employed in other regions, such as extraterritorial 
jurisdiction or unequal treaties in Asia and the Middle East, were not available. A method of 
protection was required that was compatible with the new republics’ formal sovereign equality. 
5.2. Legacy 
In this sense, the resistance of Latin America to the doctrine of state responsibility for rebels 
anticipated the resistance to state responsibility by the states which became newly independent 
in the second wave of decolonisation after the Second World War, which manifested itself in 
the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).121 Latin America – its 
states achieving independence over a century before colonies in Africa and Asia – was the site 
of the first experiment in economic imperialism beyond formal colonialism. After the Second 
World War, ‘the distinctive history of Latin American international law merged with the 
histories of the new states’.122 In both cases, international law served to legitimise this imperial 
project as well as offering a site for resistance to it and this struggle was structured around 
opposing understandings of the relationship of the international to the national. 
The failure to agree a convention on state responsibility at League of Nations Codification 
Conference at The Hague in 1930 was seen as a defeat of state responsibility on the basis of 
alien protection and as such a victory for Latin America.123 Such victory was however, only 
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temporary; in the long term, alien protection has survived and, indeed, thrived. In simple terms, 
while the International Law Commission’s codification project unhooked state responsibility 
from alien protection,124 the latter has nevertheless lived on in the specialist technical discipline 
of international investment law – in AAPL v. Sri Lanka, an ICSID tribunal confirmed state 
responsibility for rebels on the basis of due diligence, citing Sambiaggio.125 PSNR eventually 
gave way to investor protection and the international prevailed over the national.126 
Fragmentation, I suggest, has thus made more difficult the type of resistance described above 
which was posed from Latin America during the period c.1870-1930 to (economic) imperialism 
through international law. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have explored how intervention in Latin America, and particularly its turn to 
arbitration, produced the highly-contested doctrine of state responsibility for injuries to aliens 
caused by rebels. While Latin American international lawyers sought from the beginning to 
resist intervention on the basis of enforcing state responsibility, Anglo-American international 
lawyers sought to rationalise a doctrine of responsibility for rebels from the arbitral practice. 
We saw how by the early twentieth century this dynamic of resistance and development had 
driven the emergence of a flourishing, if profoundly disputed, sub-field of international law. 
Reading this history in the context of decolonisation, capitalist expansion and economic 
imperialism in Latin America, I have argued that the doctrine of state responsibility for rebels 
was produced out of and used to manage the transition from old colonialism to new imperialism 
in the region so as to guarantee foreign trade and investment. I have shown how international 
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YILC, Vol. II (Part Two). 
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law here was a site both of legitimisation of (US) imperialism and (Latin American) resistance 
to it. The history of the doctrine of state responsibility for rebels was not a matter of a 
straightforward opposition between Latin American international lawyers on one side and 
Anglo-Americans on the other. Rather, it was an encounter of a more complex nature. 
Nevertheless, I have identified two basic opposing currents which opposed national versus 
international authority and the interests of the newly decolonised capital importing states with 
those of the capital exporting imperial powers and which structured the contestation over state 
responsibility for rebels. Understanding this history is, I suggest, essential to understanding the 
post-Second World War developments in the law of state responsibility and the state of the law 
today. It helps us to put back together the pieces of alien protection which fragmented after 
1945 and illuminates how international law continues to protect foreign investment against 
rebels in the decolonised world. 
